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Background: Township-village health centers in rural areas play an important role in health service system in
China. In East China’s Jiangsu Province, the City of Haimen privatized all 25 township-village health centers in 2002.
This study assesses the effect of privatization on staff retention among these health centers.
Methods: This is a retrospective study based on 10-year administrative data from Haimen City. Three waves of
administrative data were collected in 2000 (2 years before privatization), 2005 (3 years after privatization) and 2009
(7 years after privatization) for all health care providers in Haimen City, including 3 county hospitals, 6 central
township health centers (CTHC) and 25 township-village health centers (TVHC). The effect of privatization on TVHCs’
staff retention was evaluated in comparison with the other two types of health care providers. We conducted focus
groups with people from Haimen Bureau of Health and various health care providers to help understand the
context of these administrative statistics.
Results: Each township-village health centers had an average of 40 staff members before the privatization, and the
majority of those staff members were their permanent staff. In 2005, three years after the privatization, a substantial
amount of staff decrease (from 39.7 staff members per TVHC to 27.5 per TVHC) occurred in these township-village
health centers. From 2000 to 2009, the total payroll in TVHCs decreased by almost 29%, while the number of their
permanent staff members and nurses decreased by more than 40%. Among the two types of health care providers
that did not go through a privatization, those central township health centers had no significant change on their
payroll size during this period whereas the county hospitals’ average payroll size actually increased by 20%,
especially for the number of doctors. In addition, the average salary and caseload in TVHC showed similar
decreasing trends from 2000 to 2009, while no such trends can be observed among the other two types of
providers that did not undergo privatization.
Conclusion: The privatization of township-village health center could have adverse effects on their staff retention, a
phenomenon that occurs with a decrease in salary and caseload in these centers. To ensure that these health
institutions keep providing health care for rural communities, a stronger social safety net and stronger financing of
rural health insurance might be helpful in their staff retention.
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Hospital ownership reform is an important topic for
health services researchers worldwide [1]. In China, hos-
pital ownership reform began from 1997 and accelerated
during the next ten years [2]. The Chinese development
is no exception from other countries’ patterns whereby
the resource constraints typical of public/nonprofit hos-
pitals contributed to the trend of ownership conversion
[3,4]. Below we will briefly describe the background of
hospital ownership reform in the mainland China.
As the community level of health delivery system in
China, township health centers in rural areas are aimed
to provide primary care, short-term emergency care,
long-term care, and a few specialized health services
[5-7]. Until the end of 2010, there were about 38 thou-
sand township-village health centers in China, most of
which are owned by local governments [8]. Compared to
community health care centers in urban areas, many
township health centers had faced lack of administrative
resources, low-level quality of health service, under-
regulated medical practice [9-11]. In 2001, the central
government published “Strategy on health system reform
and development in rural areas” [12], which ruled that
county governments take financial responsibility for de-
veloping public township health centers. Under this new
regulatory environment, rural township health centers
had become the pioneer of ownership conversion reform
with local governments eagerly privatizing them to avoid
the financial responsibility [13-15]. Many government-
owned township health centers were then privatized,
mainly of which are on nonprofit status. The function
of these health centers was focused on basic medical
services.
In China’s public hospitals and public health centers,
physicians, nurses and hospital technicians are generally
salaried permanent staff members. These permanent
staff members in public hospitals and public health cen-
ters in China enjoy guaranteed benefits from health
insurance and retirement pensions. And governments
reimburse public institutions the majority of these hu-
man resource’ salaries and benefits [16]. In contrast, pri-
vate health institutions had to pay all of staff members
out of their own pocket, from pension to health insu-
rance. This means that those physicians, nurses and
technicians in privatized health centers are in a much
worse social safety net than their competitors in public
hospitals. In an aging society where health care cost and
living cost both rise fast, this could mean serious chal-
lenges in employee retention for the privatized health
centers. Even before the ownership reform, insufficient
staffing has been a main drawback influencing public
township health center’s development [17]. It is necessary
then for researchers to pay attention to the issue of staff
retention after the privatization of township health centers.The impact of ownership reform has been studied from
many different angles: quality of care, human resources,
hospital capacity, hospital finances, undercompensated
care, etc. [18-22]. However, studies of China’s hospital own-
ership reform are mainly short-term evaluation [23-25].
Moreover, these studies lacked the proper “control” sample
of hospitals that had not gone through ownership reform,
while the latter were systematically different from those
privatized hospitals even before the ownership reform [23].
Based on 10-year panel data, this study tries to assess
the effect of ownership conversion on staff retention in
township health center performance. We include all of
non-converted hospitals in the same city as the control
group, and track the performance change from the pre-
reform fiscal year to those post-reform fiscal years. This
enables us to look at the issue with a more holistic and
long-term perspective than previous studies.
Methods
Study setting
This is a retrospective study. The site is Haimen City in
Jiangsu Province, a coastal province in East China (north
of Shanghai). Haimen City included 23 townships and
registered 9 million residents in 2010 [26]. Its per capita
GDP was 55.6 thousand Yuan and the disposable income
per capita among urban residents was 22.9 thousand
Yuan in 2010. Child mortality (before Age 5) and mater-
nal mortality were 8.35 per 1000 live birth and 15.79 per
100,000 pregnant women, respectively, in 2007 [27].
Before 2002, each of Haimen’s then 25 townships had
one township-village health center (TVHC) to provide
primary medical services and public health services. In
addition, there were 6 central township health centers
(CTHCs) in Haimen. A central township health center
generally plays similar functions as those of a TVHC
with moderately better equipment and a larger catch-
ment area typically covering several townships. In ad-
dition, there were 3 county hospitals in Haimen, who
provided more comprehensive health services with more
facilities and more human resources than TVHCs and
CTHCs.
Both types of township health centers in 2000 and
2001 faced the issue of underfunding from the govern-
ment. To relieve itself of the fiscal responsibility for
health centers, Haimen City Government sold all 25
township-village health centers to the private sector in
2002 [27]. Most buyers of these health centers were
former chief executive officers of the same center, and
staff members of these newly privatized centers elected
their new directors after the privatization. Although the
government retained its pension promise for those who
stayed in these privatized health centers, their new pen-
sion deal is much inferior to that in public hospitals in
that this pension benefit could only be paid out when
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the benefit payout is a lot more flexible for those in the
public sector). The government maintained the public
ownership of central township health centers and county
hospitals.
Qualitative data collection
Our qualitative data collection was conducted between
May 2010 and May 2011. Site visits were carried out in
three privatized TVHCs and one county hospital. After
that, we conducted four focus groups in Haimen, where
the informants included directors of Haimen Bureau of
Health (HBH), HBH department managers (Department
of Medicine and Department of Finance), one coun-
ty hospital manager, owners from privatized TVHCs,
TVHC clinic department heads and practitioners. These
focus groups were meant to help us learn more about
the process of privatization and to facilitate the inter-
pretation of quantitative data analysis results.
Administrative data collection
In May 2010, questionnaires were sent to hospital ma-
nagers to collect administrative information about the
health center or hospitals. Variables collected include
the service capacity of the provider (number of beds,
number of medical devices with a purchase price over
10 thousand Yuan and total asset value), the number of
staff members (physicians, nurses, technicians), caseload
(annual number of visits, annual number of discharges)
and the annual financial figures (the total revenue and
average salary).
Some data we used for this study were from official
database of Haimen Bureau of Health, and we received
its permission to use it.
Data analysis
The average payroll size of the three types of health care
providers were first measured at the baseline two years
before the privatization (2000), then 3 years (2005) and
7 years (2009) after the 2002 privatization. Then we ran
one-way ANOVA tests for each type of health care pro-
viders to examine whether the average payroll size, ave-
rage number of physicians, average number of nurses
and average number of permanent staff members were
significantly different across the three periods. Similar
ANOVA tests were then run for annual caseload and
revenue statistics (outpatient visits, inpatient discharges,
annual revenue and average salary) and service capacity
statistics (total asset value, facility’s square footage, num-
ber of beds, and number of medical devices with pur-
chase price higher than 10,000 Yuan).
As to qualitative data, two members of our team lis-
tened to the records of focus group again. They collected
the key words that informants mentioned frequently.Results
The characteristics of township-village health centers,
central township health centers and county hospitals
were described and compared in Table 1. We can see
that each township-village health centers had an average
of 40 staff members before the privatization, and major-
ity of those staff members were their permanent staff.
On average, there were 22 doctors and 7 nurses in one
health center prior to the privatization. In 2005, three
years after the privatization, a noticeable amount of de-
crease (from 39.7 staff members per TVHC to 27.5 per
TVHC) occurred in these township-village health cen-
ters. From 2000 to 2009, the total payroll in TVHCs
decreased by almost 29%, while the number of their per-
manent staff members and nurses decreased by more
than 40%. Central township health centers had no sig-
nificant change on their payroll size during this period,
although there had been a sizable decrease in permanent
staff members and nurses. At a time when privatized
TVHCs lost their staff members, county hospitals’ ave-
rage payroll size increased by 20%, especially for the
number of doctors.
In 2000, the average salary was ¥17,400 in TVHCs and
decreased to ¥15,000 in 2009 after adjusting for inflation.
CTHC had the similar level of salary as TVHCs in 2000,
however their salary level reached nearly ¥27,000 per
person in 2009 (76% higher than health TVHCs). County
hospitals paid ¥20,000 per person in 2000, higher than
that of TVHCs and central health centers. By 2009 the
salary among county hospitals increased by about 80%,
faster than the rate of increase among central health
centers (see Table 2).
In terms of capital accumulation, an average TVHC
had a total asset value of ¥2.73 million in 2000, and in-
creased almost 13% to 3 million during next 10 years,
adjusting for inflation. However the average total asset
value in central health centers and county hospitals had
increased near to 2 times and 3.6 times respectively
since 2000 (Table 3). Table 3 also compares the trends in
caseload among three different types of health care pro-
viders: TVHCs provided 19000 outpatient cases and 500
inpatient cases in 2000, and experienced almost no
changes in caseload after the privatization, while the two
other types of providers both experienced substantial in-
crease in inpatient and outpatient caseload. These diffe-
rent trends in health service capacity are also reflected
in different trends in annual revenue: the annual revenue
of TVHCs showed no obvious increase after the pri-
vatization, whereas the annual revenue of central health
centers increased by 30% and the average annual reve-
nue of county hospitals tripled since 2000 (Table 2).
These results seem to fit what we heard during the
focus groups. Although the total caseload hasn’t in-
creased after privatization, the remaining staff members
Table 1 Human resources among health care organizations in Haimen
Items Township-village health center (n = 25) Central health center (n = 6) County hospital (n = 3)
Mean Standard
error








95% CI for mean P value (ANOVA)
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Staff per organization 0.000 0.997 0.960
2000 39.7 1.7 36.3 43.2 153.3 22.9 94.6 212.1 414.7 158.7 −268.4 1097.7
2005 27.5 1.7 24.2 31.0 155.2 29.9 78.3 232.0 471.0 220.3 −476.7 1418.7
2009 28.2 2.8 22.5 33.9 152.2 34.7 63.0 241.4 496.0 233.4 −508.3 1500.3
Permanent staff per organization 0.000 0.661 0.989
2000 39.7 1.7 36.2 43.1 153.0 23.1 93.7 212.3 380.7 155.8 −289.7 1051.1
2005 26.9 1.4 24.0 30.0 137.3 22.3 80.1 194.6 407.0 180.8 −371.0 1185.0
2009 21.9 1.4 19.1 24.7 123.3 22.9 64.6 182.1 417.3 194.0 −417.4 1252.0
Doctors per organization 0.001 0.794 0.975
2000 21.6 1.0 19.5 23.7 54.3 5.9 39.1 69.6 142.3 63.9 −132.5 417.2
2005 17.2 1.0 15.1 19.2 47.0 6.0 31.6 62.5 151.3 75.0 −171.2 473.9
2009 16.7 0.8 15.1 18.4 54.3 12.6 21.9 86.7 166.0 84.0 −195.4 527.4
Nurses per organization 0.001 0.096 0.992
2000 7.1 0.5 6.1 8.1 32.2 4.9 19.5 44.8 110.7 52.9 −117.0 338.4
2005 5.4 0.7 4.0 6.8 27.2 4.2 16.4 37.9 118.0 62.6 −151.5 387.5
2009 4.1 0.4 3.3 4.9 18.3 3.4 9.5 27.2 121.7 66.3 −163.5 406.9
% permanent staff Percentage Percentage Percentage
2000 100.00% 99.80% 91.80%
2005 97.82% 88.47% 86.41%





















Table 2 Annual caseload and revenue statistics of health care providers in Haimen
Items Township-village health center (n = 25) Central health center (n = 6) County hospital (n = 3)
Mean Standard
error








95% CI for mean P value
(ANOVA)Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Number of outpatient visits (thousands) 0.158 0.270 0.382
2000 19.3 1.3 16.6 22.0 29.4 7.8 21.2 37.6 105.8 36.1 −49.7 261.3
2005 15.9 1.3 13.3 18.5 26.5 8.0 18.1 35.0 152.4 42.5 −30.6 335.4
2009 17.8 1.2 15.3 20.4 40.6 23.8 15.6 65.5 236.8 92.3 −160.3 633.8
Number of discharges 0.338 0.166 0.576
(thousands)
2000 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 1.6 0.2 1.0 2.2 5.2 2.9 −7.1 17.5
2005 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.6 1.8 0.4 0.9 2.8 8.5 4.9 −12.6 29.6
2009 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.8 2.8 0.7 1.2 4.5 13.4 7.1 −17.2 43.9
Annual revenue 0.661 0.143 0.484
(million yuan) *
2000 2.0 0.1 1.7 2.3 6.8 1.2 3.6 9.9 28.2 15.0 −36.4 92.9
2005 2.3 0.2 1.8 2.7 9.7 2.3 3.7 15.7 69.8 42.2 −111.6 251.2
2009 2.1 0.2 1.7 2.6 15.8 4.7 3.8 27.8 115.3 70.1 −186.5 417.1
Average salary 0.102 0.000 0.111
(ten thousand)*
2000 1.7 0.0 1.6 1.8 1.7 0.0 1.6 1.8 2.0 0.3 0.5 3.4
2005 1.6 0.1 1.4 1.7 2.1 0.0 2.0 2.2 2.6 0.5 0.6 4.6
2009 1.5 0.1 1.3 1.7 2.7 0.2 2.2 3.2 3.5 0.4 1.6 5.3
Notes:





















Table 3 Asset value and service capacity among health care providers in Haimen
Items Township-village health center (n = 25) Central health center (n = 6) County hospital (n = 3)
Mean Standard
error








95% CI for mean P value
(ANOVA)Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Number of beds 0.545 0.714 0.759
2000*
2005 32.4 1.6 29.2 35.6 99.2 19.3 49.6 148.8 237.0 101.6 −200.16 674.2
2009 33.8 1.7 30.3 37.3 110.8 24.2 48.7 173.0 282.0 91.9 −113.4 677.4
Number of medical devices 0.226 0.213 0.548
(over 10 thousand Yuan)
2000 6.4 0.9 4.6 8.1 31.5 3.4 22.9 40.2 106.3 51.4 −114.6 327.3
2005 7.2 0.8 5.5 8.8 52.8 11.7 22.6 83.0 206.0 99.1 −220.5 632.5
2009 8.5 1.0 6.5 10.5 54.8 11.9 24.1 85.5 285.7 154.6 −379.3 950.6
Square footage 0.667 0.479 0.637
(thousand m2)
2000 3.4 0.3 2.8 4.0 6.8 1.3 3.4 10.3 14.0 5.4 −9.27 37.2
2005 3.7 0.3 3.2 4.3 9.1 1.6 5.1 13.2 25.8 11.2 −22.3 74.0
2009 3.6 0.2 3.2 4.1 9.0 1.5 5.2 12.8 27.4 13.3 −29.8 84.6
Total asset value 0.717 0.191 0.507
(million Yuan)**
2000 2.7 0.3 2.2 3.3 8.4 1.0 5.7 11.1 32.1 14.7 −31.3 95.5
2005 3.1 0.4 2.3 3.8 15.0 2.7 8.1 22.0 100.3 60.2 −158.8 359.4
2009 3.1 0.4 2.3 3.8 24.3 9.7 −0.8 49.4 146.4 95.9 −266.0 558.9
Notes:
*: We hadn’t the data of bed count in 2000.
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load per person due to the reduced number of col-
leagues. This was often mentioned during the focus
groups as one of the major changes the 2002 pri-
vatization had brought to TVHCs. A manager from a
TVHC mentioned that their in-house pharmacy cur-
rently accounted for more than 90% of the total revenue,
indicating a lack of cash inflow for the health care
provider.
Discussion
According to our findings, the number of permanent
staff members in privatized health centers decreased
sharply after ownership reform, a finding that streng-
thens several previous observations with our longitu-
dinal data [28-30]. There are two possible reasons to
explain this phenomenon. One is the financial pressure
forced these privatized health centers to downsize their
payroll [31-33]. Prior to the ownership reform, township
health centers were not very profitable and thus de-
pended upon governmental subsidy for their very sur-
vival [34]. After privatization, those privatized health
centers no longer received any financial resource from
local governments. Moreover, the average rate of reve-
nue increase in privatized health centers from 2000 to
2009 was only one twentieth of that in unprivatized
health centers (Table 1). The result could be that the
revenue in these privatized health centers may not offset
the increasing operation cost, and thus they had to cut
down on their payrolls as one way of cost containment.
The other explanation is that employees in privatized
health centers might choose to leave partly due to un-
desirable career prospects and financial insecurity.
China’s medical professionals in public hospitals heavily
rely on their employers for pension, health insurance,
further education or training, housing, etc. In a way,
they are an alternative kind of government employees.
After privatization, these professionals live from contract
to contract, which means they lose the stable benefits
they used to have. And this loss in benefits has not been
compensated for by higher salary. Instead, our finding
showed that the average per person salary in privatized
health centers actually declined after the privatization
during a time when the country’s GDP per capita almost
tripled. According to our focus group discussions, the
performance evaluation in the privatized township
health centers was entirely based on their physicians’
caseload, whereby a higher caseload per physician brings
in higher salary for physicians. However, local residents
would prefer to go to county hospitals if they have better
insurance coverage or have relatively high income, while
physicians in township health centers do not have the
authority of “gate-keeper” to sign off a visit to county
hospitals [35]. The low-income patients and patientscovered by the more rudimentary Rural Cooperative
Medical System (RCMS) [36] might be more likely to
use township-village level facilities. And many of these
potential patients might be more likely to visit central
township health centers, which still had public owner-
ship [37]. Therefore the privatized health centers are
only left with the low-income patients whose insurance
coverage were not that generous at a time they lost the
government subsidy, contributing to their low revenue
and salary level. For the elder staff members, their
pension might still be an incentive for retention, while
younger staff members could find it more optimal to re-
sign and seek their career elsewhere. Studies showed
that staff members in township health centers were
more likely to oppose ownership reform than leaders of
health centers and officers in local government [38]. It is
no surprise then why we witnessed the loss of human
resources after the privatization.
However, we have to admit that there exists an alterna-
tive hypothesis that could explain the unsuccessful staff
retention among township health centers: China’s urba-
nization trend. The rural population in Jiangsu Province
has been shrinking since 2000 at an average annual rate of
2.6% [39], a common phenomenon throughout China. So
the demand for health service at the township level has
been lower than before. This may be also an important
reason to explain the unsuccessful staff retention in town-
ship health centers. In our study, we didn’t have enough
data to rule out this possible causal mechanism.
Ownership reform in China in health system is a re-
form initiated by the central government [40]. The aim
was to attract the individual or organizational capital to-
ward the health system, and then relieve the heavy finan-
cial distress on local government [41]. However, from
the statistics we collected, the development of privatized
health centers seriously lagged behind their counterparts
in the public sector, in financial resources and human
resources alike. This is not an optimal scenario as town-
ship health centers provide fundamental health services
to most residents in rural area, who are either without
insurance or covered by the rudimentary RCMS. To
some extent, township health centers in China share
some functions with the local government in term of
providing uncompensated care [42]. So the ownership
reform in township health centers should be different
from that in comprehensive teaching hospitals in urban
areas, as those hospitals have a much richer client pool
to serve. There were evidences that the government
could help more with the health institution’s ownership
reform [40]. One suggestion for the local government is
to be a sustainable payer to buy these private health ser-
vices at the township level. As in Turkey, government
agencies purchase some of their services from private
hospitals, which become a substantial source of revenue
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physicians by the number of insured people, not by the
number of patient visits. As in UK, although general
practitioners are entirely in the private sector, they still
have received public pensions funded jointly with state
[44]. For ownership reform among township-level health
care facilities, local government should also monitor the
post-privatization development and help foster a better
policy environment for private health centers (e.g., tax
breaks for for-profit private hospitals and tax deduction
for donations to nonprofit private hospitals) if unwanted
consequence in staff retention is witnessed.
Several important limitations compromise the external
validity of our study. Firstly, we didn’t adjust staff ratios
based on case-mix index, since there hadn’t been official
index published in China by the time we wrote this article.
Commonly, health services provided by township health
centers are unitary and simple. In addition, all health cen-
ters in our study located in same city. So health services
provided in these facilities are almost consistent. Compa-
ring the staff amount in different health centers directly
wouldn’t significantly bias the result. Secondly, although
we briefly interviewed health center executives for a better
understanding of the background information, we didn’t
interview those staff members who left health centers du-
ring or after ownership reform. This would limit our un-
derstanding of the real reasons behind their resignation.Conclusions
As our case showed, one of the unwanted results of the
privatization could be that the total amount of health pro-
fessionals decreased. Without adequate and sustained sup-
port for these health professionals working at the frontline
of China’s health, township health centers after privatization
are experiencing a serious brain drainage, which threatens
the very base of China’s population health. The local gov-
ernment, simply by strengthening the social safety net for
all working people, can substantially reduce the career risk
of those who work in privatized health centers and thus
make those health centers competitive in providing primary
health care for the rural communities. In the short-term,
stronger financing for the rural health insurance plan (New
Rural Cooperative Scheme) might be an efficient and effec-
tive way of improving the financial well-being of privatized
TVHCs.
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